Nominated stake allows you to support validators and share in the rewards (and slashing) without operating a validator node yourself. Validators may choose to retain a percentage of the rewards to offset the cost of running a validator node. Apart from that, all rewards are shared based on the stake supporting each validator. This includes the stake of the validator itself and any stake bonded by nominators.
Validators determine their preference as a percentage of the block reward, not a fixed number of CERE. The block reward of Cere is determined by the total stake, peaking when the staked amount reaches 50% of the total supply.
Every era, an approximately 24-hour period in Cere, rewards are distributed to validators in proportion to the number of era points they've earned. These reward points are accrued for actions like:
An "uncle block" refers to a valid Relay Chain block that, due to timing or network conditions, fails to become canonical. This occurs when multiple validators produce blocks in a single slot, but the block from one validator reaches the subsequent block producer before the others, making the latter "uncle blocks".
Payouts are executed at the conclusion of every era.
Era points introduce a probabilistic aspect to staking rewards.
If we consider the mean of staking rewards as the average per era, the variance describes the deviation from this average. The precise CERE value of each era point isn't determined beforehand since it's based on the total number of points earned by all validators in a given era. This structure ensures that the total payout per era is influenced by Cere’s inflation model, not just the quantity of payable actions (e.g., authoring a new block).
This is merely a high-level outline of the probabilistic characteristic of staking rewards. Let:
pe = para-validator era pointsne = non-para-validator era pointsEV = expected value of staking rewardsHere, EV(pe) impacts the EV more than EV(ne) does.
Given EV(pe)'s greater influence on EV, the increased variance against the EV becomes noticeable among different validator pools (i.e., active validators and those chosen for para-validation).
Also, let:
v = the variance of staking rewardsp = number of para-validatorsw = number of validators in the active sete = eraThus, v rises if w increases, since this reduces the p to w ratio in relation to e.
Despite v escalating from era to era, the reward each validator obtains will balance out over time due to the continuous selection of para-validators.